Same Mistakes Repeat—Why Does Tapan Deka Still Refuse to Learn?

"They confuse activity with accomplishment and secrecy with competence."

This brutal assessment from a top Intelligence official during the CIA's darkest hours of Intelligence management failures in the 1980s-90s now eerily mirrors the Intelligence Bureau today. The November 10th bomb strike— perhaps the largest since Mumbai's 2006 train bombings—has exposed critical fault lines in India's intelligence machinery. While power corridors buzz with claims of "averting a major attack," Intelligence Bureau Director Tapan Deka seems content with what he perceives as a consolation prize, as recently put by the current Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan- "There are no consolation prize in war" in the context of modern warfare.

The Union Home Minister, Amit Shah, had given multiple instructions to improve and modernise our intelligence management systems and their capabilities, both technical and human, a top source in the intelligence establishment said. However, IB’s top leadership is still reeling to understand what exactly “Intelligence management " is and how to inject it into the organisation. The recent blast was not an Intelligence failure but an Intelligence management failure, a top source in the security establishment added. There are three key observations that IB must read multiple times.

First, the intelligence was gathered through circumstantial developments rather than organic sources. According to top sources, a key leader of the Kashmir terror group secretly left the country for Afghanistan in mid-August. He had been tasked with liaising between the terror cell and the Afghan network for activities like bomb making. The key leader was based in Srinagar before departing the country, a top source added. Therefore, it wasn’t the IB’s original work- Information fell into IB's lap, IB should have created the intelligence net.

Second, if intelligence was collected, why wasn’t it managed professionally and effectively? To handle intelligence properly, two things must work simultaneously—“Coordination and Connection,” a top intelligence establishment source said and even echoed by former Special Secretary R&AW Vapaala Balachandran.

A coordination grid activates when there is a rapid flow of intelligence, but in this case, IB and other security units on the ground made two mistakes—excessive flash and a lack of well-organized covert nabbing operations. This led to a disorganized response and fragmented intelligence, which caused IB to spend too much time connecting the dots.

The basic principle taught in the School of Intelligence, even advocated by Sherman Kent, the father of Intelligence studies, is to filter out the noise first and then assess or process the intelligence at hand. However, the IB’s way of processing intelligence is no better than that of local police intelligence units, which often have more noise and less substance, making it difficult for the IB to connect multiple dots during crises.

State of Affairs In SIB

The SIB unit of Delhi, headed by an IPS officer, works as if he is running a small CID unit, with a hands-off approach, a top source said. Possibly, this happened when Pandora’s box of intelligence opened after the crackdown events by the J&K police, leading to a slight overload in connecting the dots, creating a blind spot or slip at the execution level. This resulted in one terrorist escaping, going off the radar, and driving the streets of Delhi undetected, possibly with an explosive-laden vehicle, a top source added. “Though in Intelligence there cannot be a perfect state, but at least the Intelligence basics of IB should have been on point,” all this could have been smoothly executed had the IB worked on intelligence management skills, a top source in the security establishment said.

IB made a similar patterned mistake as in the Pahalgam attack; they had the intelligence, but it was poorly processed and executed, a top source added. Where CIA failed in 9/11 or Indian agencies during 26/11 detection—"No”, intelligence was sent; management was poor in executing the intelligence.

Third: No Marks For Attempt: The widely circulated argument that IB has minimised or averted a major terror attack is simply poor reasoning at face value if IB believes it actually prevented it. “A close attention suggests- It was a failure, a message had to be delivered that they could strike deeper in the cities that are too close to the Red Fort, which is much higher on symbolism” had that IED was mature and terrorists were highly trained then aversion story and IB would not have been in this face-saving position or to hide behind it - in they came to deliver the message and they delivered it,” a top source in the Intelligence establishment observed.

The Deka Dilemma

“Those who lack courage will always find philosophy to justify it,”- Albert Camus an American novelist, perhaps a silent observation by some top intelligence echelons in power corridors on Tapan Deka. Deka may be a gentleman among his few peers and have some grasp of global terror history, but tradecraft does not forgive those who do not do justice and apply learnings to the position of spymaster; perhaps IB’s chief, Tapan Deka, is currently reeling from this reality. He is the first to serve the longest tenure as DIB in current times, but possibly the first DIB of current times under whose watch two intelligence failures or management failures occurred almost in quick succession of months. Every DIB can do ordinary intelligence and counterintelligence work, but what actually sets a DIB apart is his/her capability to transform IB’s tradecraft behaviour and skills. Perhaps he could learn if he took good lessons from his predecessors’ learnings.

The Real DIBs

Shaymlal Dutta, former IB director known to steer the bureau during the Kargil war, while New Delhi divided on intelligence failure and battlefield operations, Shaymlal Dutta focused on intelligence management in crises, “flipping the bureau from a top-down approach where DIB personally assesses situations, coordinates, and disseminates UOs and other key assessments to help Joint Directors and key men on the ground to process intelligence properly during crises” a top source said. Similarly, former DIB Asif Ibrahim whose ‘s expertise on counter terrorism was not merely a template he extensively worked on improving IB tradecraft and assessment readings on counter terror operations, a top source said.

Support System Failure

To execute such a high level of intelligence management, one also needs to have strong SA with solid strategic security knowledge at the top to provide high-quality operational support to DIB. The current DIB’s SA is no less than a paper robot, which further complicates the bureau’s intelligence management work, a top source said. FBI and CIA Directors have Special Assistants who take on roles beyond clerical and administrative work and provide high-quality operational support, top source added.

IB should not view this as a success but should focus seriously on closing intelligence management gaps to enhance their proactive responses and ground operations. The question of why MHA still tolerates Tapan Deka, whose health is declining as clearly evident from his health bills in IB, a top source added  and whose tradecraft skills are limited to textbook knowledge rather than practical application, is intriguing; top intelligence establishments debate. However, as Deka prepares to leave office in almost seven months, he must learn one lesson: intelligence work extends beyond secrecy and tip-offs.